1. Although they are unaware of it, homogeneity is the most significant characteristic of the Italians. Despite claiming a fragmented sense of "otherness," their most strategic dimension lies in their cultural uniformity. The inhabitants of the Bel Paese exhibit clear distinctions of an economic, civic, and administrative nature—to the point that they often believe themselves to be distant or foreign to one another. Yet, they manifest none of the irreparable divisions that weigh upon significantly more powerful states, especially when examined in a relative sense or compared to other Western peoples (and beyond). Italians recognize only one national language; all other idioms are, by definition, dialects. They share the same Catholic culture; within the "Boot," no alien theology has produced competing customs. They live in a single ethnic community; here, one finds no alternative tribes or peoples. They produce a single geopolitical construct; here, there are no states or fiefdoms in competition with one another.
Rather, it is precisely the absence of anthropological fault lines that allows the Bel Paese to exist without an efficient state apparatus, the population to remain outside of history, and a secessionist party to transform into a nationalist one without significant upheaval. This is because the inconsistencies of the Italians are micro-cultural in nature, incapable of transcending their common lineage. They do not affect the ancestral character of the citizens, which was easily distinguishable even before the Risorgimento. In the future, such uniformity could become the primary asset at the "Boot's" disposal. In the coming years, the absence of a concrete hiatus between its parts could allow Italy to preserve itself—to overcome the considerable shocks that will inevitably strike, from economic and demographic decline to the implosion of the European community and the increasing entropy within the American sphere of influence. Provided, however, that the population becomes aware of its singular nature and grasps its intrinsic benefit.
2. Italy is a pure cultural invention. Unlike what occurred in Poland or Norway, here civilization is more powerful than any ethnic matrix. On a genetic level, Italians simply do not exist. As is visually evident, recent studies of Italic DNA have confirmed that the population is the result of overlapping waves of diverse migration and colonization: from the spread of indigenous peoples to the arrival of the Greeks, from Roman dominance to the Germanic invasions, and from the rise of the Arabs to the incursions of northern neighbors. Yet, in the demographic sphere, the communal dimension is always preeminent over the biological one. The sense of belonging inevitably prevails over blood ties, ultimately forging an anthropologically compact nation. It is no coincidence that "Italians" have been a subject of discussion since the Middle Ages, at a time when the birth of a national subject was not even contemplated. Unlike the case of France, here the State did not produce the nation. The—albeit brief—era of unification has germinated a population that is indistinct on linguistic, cultural, and territorial levels.
For centuries, Italian has been considered the sole language of the peninsula, long before it was spoken by the majority of the population. This dates back to the 16th century, when the Venetian Cardinal Pietro Bembo identified 14th-century Tuscan as the canon to be imposed on the rest of the country. This occurred without the kind of disputes seen in France between the langue d’oc and the langue d’oïl. It was a choice of purely intellectual origin—unique in its kind—as Florentine had not established itself through military conquest or dynastic unions. It was accepted without objection by the literati; thus, in 1827, thirty-four years before political unification, Alessandro Manzoni sought to "wash his clothes in the Arno" (refining the language of The Betrothed), equipped with a specific dictionary. Subsequently, it was embraced by the population upon the birth of the Kingdom of Italy, leading to its capillary diffusion across the territory.
Today, standardized Florentine is perceived by the inhabitants of the "Boot" as their highest instrument of expression. While dialects remain widely used, the vernacular is not afforded the same dignity as the national language—a fact signaled by its inferior designation. Furthermore, there are no idioms within the Bel Paese that concretely compete with Italian, not even at a local level, despite sporadic attempts to revive local tongues. In Sardinia, for example, the limba was first elevated to a bureaucratic tool—though residents cannot truly write it—and was recently unrecognized as a unified tongue by a regional bill that divides it into Campidanese, Logudorese, and numerous other variants.
In many European countries (and beyond), the situation is markedly different. In Spain, Catalan, Galician, and Basque—a language entirely alien to Indo-European roots—openly challenge the primacy of Castilian. In the Iberian nation, schools teach at least four different mother tongues, with Madrid forced to accept the fait accompli. The same occurs in Germany, where Bavarian is considered a lingua franca on par with official German and certainly superior to Plattdeutsch. In those parts, High German (Hochdeutsch) is disparagingly referred to as "written German" (Schriftdeutsch). Similarly, in Belgium, French and Dutch vie for the status of national language; in the United Kingdom, Scots and Gaelic endure alongside English; and in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Russian is often used as much as the indigenous languages.
On a religious level, there is no alternative Church to that of Rome in Italy. Beyond the spiritual dimension—whether practiced or not—Catholic culture belongs to all inhabitants, often unconsciously. Italy is not divided between Romans and Lutherans like Germany or Hungary; nor among Catholics, Protestants, and Evangelicals like the United States, Switzerland, or the Netherlands. It lacks the divisions between Anglicans, Presbyterians, Catholics, or Methodists found in the UK, or the complex landscape of Ukraine, split between various Orthodox patriarchates and Uniates. Italian history has seen no wars of religion like those of its neighbors. There was no St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, nor an Edict of Nantes to prove that Paris is "worth a mass." The principle of cuius regio, eius et religio was never applied, nor did Italy witness the rise of an Oliver Cromwell. In fact, Catholicism has been the sole religion of the population since Constantine's Edict of Milan (313). Since then, no antagonistic ecclesiastical structure has existed. Consequently, Italians are "twice loyal" to their capital for both political and ecclesiastical reasons—often a hindrance to national institutional functionality, but a further sign of profound cultural adherence.
Furthermore, Italy does not host substantial allogeneic (foreign) populations, whether real or perceived. The linguistic minorities in specific regions (Germanic, Slovene, Occitan) are so minuscule at a national level (barely 1.2%) that they do not represent a culturally significant factor, although South Tyroleans remain a sensitive dossier. Meanwhile, larger minorities (Romanians, Moroccans, Albanians, etc.) are too geographically dispersed to constitute an "alien" entity in the medium term. At our latitudes, one does not find Orangemen and Secessionists, Turks and Kurds, or Catalans and Spaniards—peoples composed of millions of individuals, perfectly indigenous and settled for centuries.
For many centuries—since the Norman or Arab invasions—the Italian ethnicity has not been threatened on its own soil. To the point that the term "Italian ethnic group" was used for the first time only in the 1975 Treaty of Osimo. Nor has the Italian population ever dissolved into tribes, a phenomenon highly present elsewhere. Consider the Germanic space, composed of Bavarians (formally gathered in their "Free State"), Swabians, Prussians, Hanseatics, Swiss, and Austrians. Germans do not all inhabit the same state: 5.5 million live in Switzerland and another 8 million in Austria, compared to only 350,000 Italophones in Switzerland. Thus, the distinction between "Little" and "Greater" Germans is entirely unknown to us. Equally tribal is Belgium, split between Walloons and Flemings—tribes by definition hostile to the assimilation of outsiders, particularly those of Middle Eastern origin, hence the extraordinary spread of jihadism in the "Low Country." Or Canada, home to Quebecers so reluctant to absorb immigrants that the latter invariably become Anglophones among Francophones. In Italy, the lingering inter-regional racism is civic and economic in nature, never ethnic, much less tribal. Even in their distances, Italians remain a single people—a condition shared by very few Western nations, from Poland to the United States, from France to Portugal and Ireland. This carries the further advantage of having developed no purely geopolitical "otherness," which is potentially the most insidious threat to a nation's survival.
3. The existing distinctions among Italians do not produce groups that are mutually alien. Certainly, there are significant differences between the industrialized North and the underdeveloped South. However, jarring economic disparities do not create distinct peoples, nor do they produce "otherness." The gap does not translate into a difference of lineage. Rather, it fits into a conventional—albeit bitter—dialectic between parts, typical of a country experiencing vastly different rates of prosperity. This is largely overestimated by Italians themselves, who are accustomed to focusing on mutual differences and mistaking them for anthropological cleavages. Moreover, the opposing levels of development between North and South were complementary for a long time, at least as long as the South could boast an exuberant demography and a lower median age. In reality, only ethnic distances translate territoriality into separate nations and trigger implosions. The Italian Civil War—a nearly unique case in history—was not fought between territories, one against the other. In fact, it had no geographical connotation; it was perfectly cross-sectional. Hinged upon the events of the Second World War, it saw fascists and anti-fascists present in every district of the occupied Center-North. The first partisan groups organized simultaneously in Boves (Piedmont) and Bosco Martese (Abruzzo), and the first killing was recorded in Verona. The clashes continued until the spring of 1945 throughout the entire area not yet conquered by the Anglo-Americans, involving militiamen of every cultural and regional background. There was no American "Dixieland" against a Yankee Northeast. No Vendée arrayed against Paris. Nor a republican Catalonia against a monarchist Castile. There were only Italians fighting among themselves to determine the political form of the new State, not to create others.
Furthermore, Italy does not contain alternative nations. There are no Flanders, Basque Countries, Bavarias, Catalonias, Britanies, Scotlands, Transylvanias, Quebecs, or Kurdistans here. For us, the fate of England—a nation among others that compose the United Kingdom—would be unthinkable. The Bel Paese does not even display the inconsistencies typical of a state that was long a tributary to various empires and thus marked by the presence of distinct peoples. This is an intrinsic characteristic of many Central and Eastern European countries that were once provinces of the Russian, Austrian, or Ottoman empires. This explains why a substantial Russian minority is present in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (partially rendered stateless); similarly, in Slovakia, 12% of citizens are Hungarian, and nearly two million Magyars also live in Romania as indigenous inhabitants of Transylvania.
The uniqueness of the Italian stock is revealed in the political arena—a context usually of no geopolitical relevance, but useful for reading underlying phenomena. In the "Boot," there are no ethnic parties pertaining to the Italian population (the Südtiroler Volkspartei and the Union Valdôtaine belong to foreign minorities). In Italy, national parties do not need to define themselves at a regional or tribal level. This contrasts with Germany and the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which is only related to the national CDU and possesses exceptional independence and influence, with its own leader having served as Minister of the Interior.
The same applies to Spain, where each specific nation (comunidad, in the sugar-coated phrasing of the post-Franco constitution) possesses its own ethnic movements, and even national parties are often forced to adopt local guises—most notably the Socialists' Party of Catalonia and the Socialist Party of the Basque Country, allies of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). In Canada, the Liberal Party is national only in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, forced to compromise with various provincial factions that differ in approach and policy. Not to mention Great Britain, home to the powerful Scottish National Party or the decisive Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland.
Rather, the opposite phenomenon has occurred in Italy. The Lega, originally a secessionist faction, has converted into a national party, adopting a sovereignist rhetoric without any embarrassment. This is an extraordinary trajectory that has no precedent, made possible only by the underestimated homogeneity of the electorate. In the last general elections, after removing the word "North" from its symbol, the Lega garnered over a million votes in the very South it wanted to abandon to its fate only fifteen years ago. Specifically: 17.1% of the vote in Abruzzo, 11% in Sardinia, nearly 10% in Molise, almost 8% in Basilicata, and 7% in Puglia (with 16% in Lazio). These percentages would be simply unattainable if "Padania" and, conversely, the "Mezzogiorno" actually existed, as differing ethnic identities would prevent such blends and political pivots.
It is an emblematic case: by allied itself with the Lega last March, the Sardinian Action Party finally succeeded in electing two of its members to the Parliament in Rome, a result it had not achieved in 22 years. This represents a mechanism that is the reverse of what is seen in many Western nations.
Meanwhile, the success achieved by the Five Star Movement in the South does not betray regionalist traits or localist ambitions. This is not only because the party has a strong presence in the Center-North as well; the reasons for its success are essentially economic in nature, certainly not anthropological. They are fueled by social malaise, not by a desire to impose one part of the country over the rest. The ethnic correspondence of the Italian population does not allow for the substantial rise of ethnic-based forces. In the coming years, this could prove decisive in determining the survival of the Republic.
4. Nation-states are reclaiming the European stage. After decades spent propagating the end of peoples and borders, the Old Continent is experiencing the inevitable re-emergence of nations—driven by American will. Having previously considered European integration as functional to its imperial interests, for some years now the superpower can no longer tolerate the German attempt to transform the European Union into its own sphere of influence, even if still embedded within the Washington Consensus.
In this phase, the United States intends to loosen the bonds of the continental architecture, possibly without destroying it, by favoring competition among indigenous nations in an attempt to draw Berlin back into the fray. This purpose is compounded by the necessity, dictated by the perceived "imperial burden," to involve allies more deeply in the military maintenance of Eurasia. Added to this is the partial acceptance of geopolitical chaos as a phenomenon capable of undermining the actions of antagonists. In time, the Americans will once again demand greater cohesion from their clientes as soon as a dangerous enemy appears on the horizon and it becomes urgent once more to close ranks.
However, in the medium term, the revival of States risks disarticulating the most heterogeneous populations—those entities that are not, in fact, nations. This is precisely what has happened in recent months to Spain and the United Kingdom, both suddenly brought to the brink of collapse. Since Brexit, the British government has been occupied with preventing the state’s implosion, potentially triggered by the centrifugal tendencies of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and London itself. Similarly, Madrid is preoccupied with preventing the secession of Catalonia, also to discourage Galicia or the Basque Country from following its lead.
Italy, however, could avoid such a bitter fate precisely through its unrecognized homogeneity. The absolute preeminence of the main ethnic stock could allow the country to weather shocks without tearing itself apart, and to absorb blows without collapsing. It could even adopt painful measures without fearing that one part of the nation might opt out. This is a stability that Rome may desperately need in the immediate future, given the insidious challenges that could lie ahead—situations where the status quo might suddenly collapse. These range from a sine die suspension of the Schengen Protocol, leaving Italians to manage migration flows alone, to the reconstitution of the European continent into distinct and antagonistic blocs entrenched behind national borders—the Visegrád faction against what remains of the Franco-German axis, Mitteleuropa against the Southern space, or the "Hanseatic League" against everyone else. There is even the possibility that Germany might create a North European currency (the "Neuro"), technically capable of splitting Italy in two economically, since the North is an integral part of the German value chain while the South is excluded from it.
In this specific case, if it succeeds in leveraging its systemic importance and the privilege of being able to turn its gaze away from the domestic front, the Italian government could engage with the major European powers on its own terms. It would not have to worry about a foreign government undermining its actions by inciting sedition within one of its factions—a luxury that few countries on the continent can afford. It is a luxury that the Baltic states, Romania, or once again Spain (currently dependent on the "guild solidarity" shown by European states in recent months) could not sustain. Thus, if a Kerneuropa (Core Europe) were to emerge and Northern Italy wished to remain within the German productive sphere to the point of adopting a new Teutonic currency, Rome would have the tools to impose a solution unwelcome to the country's wealthiest regions in order to keep the "Boot" united. The goal would be to break free from foreign spheres of influence and improve the economic condition of the South, which is incompatible with such a heavy currency. This would likely involve reminding Northern small and medium-sized enterprises that the Center-South remains their primary export market, indispensable for growth, and that participating in another's productive system means physiologically placing oneself within a foreign sphere of influence to which one is ethnically alien and geopolitically conflicted.
These dimensions of Italian steadfastness are superior to what many nations can boast. However, they currently exist only in theory—perpetually awaiting concrete application through a dual awakening of both the government and the people..
5. Italians lack nearly all the geopolitical requirements necessary to rise to the status of a major power. They are not maximalists; rather, they live in a post-historical dimension that they seraphically mistake for reality. They are not young, and thus are unwilling to sustain the effort required to pursue the most demanding objectives. They are not prolific—that is, they are incapable of asserting themselves through numbers and demographic expansion. They lack social discipline, and consequently, they fall short of the constancy indispensable for hitting long-term targets, often wearing themselves out before the task is complete. They do not accept their Mediterranean nature, preferring to dream of themselves as continentals and abandoning applied tactics.
However, they possess their primary strategic resource in their ethnic uniqueness. Despite every stereotype, Italy proves to be less fragmented than is commonly believed. This is an unsuspected yet decisive condition. It is already inertially sufficient for "sailing by sight"—that is, for retreating into their common core and averting disintegration whenever structural inconsistencies preclude the achievement of ambitious goals. Quite simply, Italians are too identical to escape from themselves.
This is, therefore, a factor potentially capable of increasing national influence within the current international context: the ability to profit from the American intention to accentuate the role of States through the unconscious uniformity of the population. In this regard, Italy is better positioned than many Western countries—provided that Italians identify their primary strategic trait in their homogeneity rather than in territorial particularism, and that they recognize being a nation as their most relevant advantage on the eve of the overwhelming return of history.
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